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Abstract: Due to the drastic increase of electricity prosumers, i.e., energy consumers that are also
producers, smart grids have become a key solution for electricity infrastructure. In smart grids,
one of the most crucial requirements is the privacy of the final users. The vast majority of the
literature addresses the privacy issue by providing ways of hiding user’s electricity consumption.
However, open issues in the literature related to the privacy of the electricity producers still remain.
In this paper, we propose a framework that preserves the secrecy of prosumers’ identities and
provides protection against the traffic analysis attack in a competitive market for energy trade in a
Neighborhood Area Network (NAN). In addition, the amount of bidders and of successful bids are
hidden from malicious attackers by our framework. Due to the need for small data throughput for
the bidders, the communication links of our framework are based on a proprietary communication
system. Still, in terms of data security, we adopt the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128
bit with Exclusive-OR (XOR) keys due to their reduced computational complexity, allowing fast
processing. Our framework outperforms the state-of-the-art solutions in terms of privacy protection
and trading flexibility in a prosumer-to-prosumer design.
Keywords: smart grid privacy; energy trade; traffic analysis attack; cryptography
1. Introduction
The power grid is a crucial large-scale infrastructure. In order to allow high levels of automation,
information security, distributed energy control, and robust load fluctuation management of the
power grids, smart grids (SGs) are essential. Several interdisciplinary aspects are treated in SG
such as interoperability, information security, scalability, reliability, energy efficiency, reusability,
communication backbone, electrical actuators, and sensor and control technologies [1]. Although the
SGs are constantly improved, they are still vulnerable to cyber attacks. Hence, current power grids
should be further improved to fit the demands regarding data security [2] and energy trade between
prosumers [3,4].
To the best of our knowledge, there are open issues in the literature with respect to data protection
associated with trade prices between producers. For instance, the main efforts towards privacy
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consists of obfuscating the instantaneous consumption pattern of each consumer [5,6]. This is generally
accomplished by hiding the instantaneous power consumption of the client as fine-grained data can
reveal in detail the lifestyle of the consumer [7,8]. However, the profile of traded energy also delivers
relevant information about prosumers to their neighbors. As in [9], the ability to link the bids to
individual consumers allows the untrusted entity to build up a profile of the consumer’s behavior.
In particular, the quantities of traded energy can be very informative about the economical welfare
of the owner [10]. Privacy requirements dictate that prosumers cannot gain information regarding
other prosumers’ consumption and production—not even if they are trade partners [11]. Models
dealing with energy trade directly among prosumers [3,12] limit themselves to exploiting the trade
environment without discussing in detail data-security aspects related to the identities of the traders
in relation to their neighbors. As a consequence, several topics related to privacy requirements are still
open in SGs, such as power production and bidding in trading systems.
In this paper, we consider the problem of providing data privacy for self-interested players
that trade energy in the context of a Neighborhood Area Network (NAN). The energy is sold by
local micro-generators and locally purchased by their neighbors, also known as the final users.
Our framework deals simultaneously with SG data-security requirements and energy-trade systems.
As a first contribution, the proposed framework has a privacy-preserving model which has a low
computational complexity and avoids completely an unauthorized party to identify the bidders,
the number or types of them, and even whether the bids achieve a deal. As a second contribution,
all the bids are made clear to the NAN participants, with all Smart Meter (SM) owners having access
to how many bids are proposed and their types, prices, and quantities. As a third contribution, we
propose a clearing price mechanism that allows for each a Smart Meter (SM) to calculate the final
prices and respective amounts of energy that are traded, including a financial reward to the power-grid
company. Nevertheless, the proposed framework avoids totally any access to the bidders identities.
Once each node learns the bids, it processes individually the information obtained in order to know the
quantities and prices effectively traded. The communication links are provided by a patent-pending
proprietary communication system [13].
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 surveys the state-of-the-art in terms of
SG-security requirements and energy-trading schemes for electricity markets. We use the technical
requirements observed in the literature to present a detailed problem description in Section 3. Section 4
details the proposed framework for energy trade in a NAN. Section 5 shows the results, and Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. SG-Trading Systems and Data Security—State-of-the-Art
In this section, we provide an overview of the literature with respect to trading systems and data
security in SG. First, we present basic characteristics of trading systems for connected prosumers in
Section 2.1 and auctions in Section 2.2. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, data security towards privacy and
cryptographic systems applied to smart grids are revised, respectively. Additionally, in Section 2.5,
blockchain-based transactive energy systems are reviewed.
2.1. Trading Systems for SG Prosumers
In a Neighborhood Area Network (NAN), each household unit is represented as a Home Area
Network (HAN) and is equipped with an SM [14]. Some of the HANs are prosumers that, in some
occasions, export energy to the grid from their Distributed Energy Resources (DER).
There are three different compensation mechanisms in [15] associated to topologies of DER
installation and billing regimes. The first mechanism is the Net Energy Metering (NEM) that allows a
DER that is generating a surplus of electricity to export the excess to the grid, earning a corresponding
credit in kilowatt-hours (kWh). In order to correctly effectuate the measurements, in the NEM, the SM
is bidirectional. The second scheme is the Buy All, Sell All, an arrangement that provides a standard
sell rate to a DER system for all of the electricity they generate. In Buy All, Sell All schemes, the HAN
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cannot consume the energy that the DER produces, exporting it entirely. The third arrangement is Net
Billing, in which the DER system owner can consume electricity generated by the DER in real time
and can export any generation in excess of on-site consumption to the grid—all net energy exports are
metered and credited at a predetermined sell rate without kWh banking. For a more detailed review
of the features of the three compensation mechanisms, we refer to [15].
Since the prosumers in a NAN are able to trade their energy not only with their neighbors but
also with the utility company, the aforementioned mechanisms must consider consumer-to-consumer
trade designs. The NEM characteristic of not allowing financial reward for the exceeding energy
makes it unable to use the proposed frameworks, which are applicable to the Buy All, Sell All and Net
Billing systems.
From the standpoint of energy trade, there are two predominant perspectives about the nature of
electricity as a commercial good. When energy is seen as a public service, the tendency is the proposal
of a cooperative game among non-selfish players, as in [16–18], where the underlying goal is market
control and the achievement of social fairness. Alternatively, when the main goals are market efficiency
and decentralization [19–21], energy is seen as commodity to be traded and a free market model is
sought. In this paper, we align our analysis to the latter group. Table 1 summarizes the division of
approaches in the literature with regards to the commercial treatment of energy.
Table 1. Commercial treatment of energy and the respective approaches in the literature.
Criterion Cooperative Games Competitive Games
How energy is predominantly seen as a public good as a commodity
Main goals social fairness, market control decentralization, market efficiency
Main references [17,18,22–33] [3,4,19–21,34–42]
With regards to energy prices in the SG, the consumers can purchase energy either from the power
grid or from other prosumers. In the first case, a key aspect is that the utility company, which is the
company responsible for managing all power grid assets and its operation, usually sells the energy for
a unitary price Pu to its consumers and purchases the energy from the prosumers by a smaller price,
Pl [15,16,43]. Therefore, an interval of energy unitary prices that enable trades between prosumers and
consumers is given by Pl < Pb < Pu, where Pb is the price of local traders with which all final users
obtain profit with regards to Pu and Pl , since every purchaser is supposed to prefer paying Pb < Pu for
the kWh, with a symmetric interpretation by the side of the sellers.
2.2. Auctions in the Electricity Systems and the Preston McAfee
Auction mechanisms have been the cornerstone of many applications in wholesale and retail
electric power markets [40]. They are recurrent in electricity market, either under competitive or
cooperative frameworks [34,36,44], as a way of obtaining prices, especially in the case of competitive
trade mechanisms.
An auction is a method of allocating goods with an explicit set of rules determining resource
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants [45]. According to [46],
auctions can be single dimensional, when the price is the only factor taken into account,
or multidimensional, when other aspects are distinguished, such as product quality. In a one-sided
auction, bidders are either purchasers or sellers and the auctioneer is responsible for deciding which
is the winning bid, differing from two-sided auctions, in which both sellers and purchasers offer
bids. In an open-cry auction, every bidder has access to every other bid, whereas in a sealed-bid
auction, only the auctioneer has access to the offers of all bidders. Single-unit and multi-unit auctions
refer to when there are one or several units of a given good; they differ from combinatorial auctions,
where multiple, heterogeneous goods are auctioned simultaneously.
According to [47], an ideal double-auction mechanism would satisfy the following properties:
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• Individual Rationality (IR)—A trading user should have positive utility. The IR is a necessary
property for a price mechanism.
• Incentive Compatibility (IC)—Reporting the true value is a dominant strategy.
• Balanced Budget (BB)—The auctioneer should not lose or gain from the trade. For real-world
applications, if the auctioneer does not have to subsidize the trade (called weakly BB property),
then it is acceptable.
• Economic Efficiency (EE)—The social welfare should be maximized.
In [48], it has been shown that it is impossible for a mechanism to satisfy all of the four properties.
Trade-reduction mechanisms and its variations such as the Preston McAfee’s Double Auction Protocol
(PMD) [49] are IR, IC, and weakly BB [47]. The McAfee’s PMD is said to be weakly BB [47], i.e., a
system in which the auctioneer does not lose but may gain money. A strongly BB system is observed
when the auctioneer does not lose nor gain any money [50].
Auctions are frequently analyzed in terms of the social welfare that they provide. According to
[10], social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, given by the difference between willingness-to-pay
and clearing price, and producer surplus, which is the difference between clearing price and costs. In
[51], an agent competition double-auction mechanism is proposed to simplify decision making and
to promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. A quasi-linear utility function
is assumed for each bidder. Such function is presented as the difference between the valuation of
the item and the amount of money that each bidder actually receives or pays for. A comprehensive
analysis of literature towards maximization of social welfare and minimization of aggregated power
consumption for Demand Response (DR) programs is presented in [52]. [37] examined the effect of
energy storage on the SG in terms of global social welfare, considering that agents have homogeneous
efficiency and running costs. The work in [26,53] shows mechanisms for social welfare calculations in
a DR environment.
A common aspect in [10,16,19,26,37,52–54] is that they do not take into account the welfare of the
utility company itself. It is evident that a great part of the social welfare losses in current applications
lie with the utility companies, as they are resistant against energy trade from local prosumers in
decentralized generation structures. In this sense, an interesting double-auction model is given by [49],
which proposes the Preston McAfee’s Double Auction Protocol (PMD). In this auction, the bids of the
m purchasers bi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, are sorted as in
b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bm, (1)
while the bids of the n sellers si, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, are
s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sn. (2)
In PMD, it is necessary to determine the number of bids k such that bk ≥ sk and bk+1 < sk+1. As a
function of the k purchasers’ and sellers’ offers, we calculate the price
p0 =
bk+1 + sk+1
2
. (3)
When the kth offer satisfies sk ≤ p0 ≤ bk, all the k purchasers and sellers trade with price p0.
Otherwise, only the first (k− 1) purchasers and sellers trade and every purchaser pays bk while every
seller receives sk when the auctioneer is rewarded with
U0 = (k− 1)(bk − sk). (4)
According to [55], when the first condition holds, the result is a Pareto efficient mechanism,
whereas in the second hypothesis, it is not. Note that McAfee’s double auction does not take into
account quantities, as they were idealized for oral double auctions in the stock market [49].
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Purchasers and sellers have welfare that are expressed by the positive payoff that they achieve
by trading a good with an advantage in terms of their valuations. The welfare of the purchasers is
the difference between willingness to pay and the clearing price, while the welfare of the sellers is the
difference between the clearing price and costs [10]. Considering fi as the welfare of the purchaser i
and gj as that of the seller j, I and J are the groups of purchasers and sellers and di,j is the price of the
transaction when purchaser i achieves a deal with seller j. The social welfare maximization problem is
defined in [51] as follows:
V( f , g, d) = Maximize ∑
i
fixi +∑
j
gjyj −∑
i,j
di,jzi,j, (5)
subject to
∑
j
zi,j = xi, for each i ∈ I,
∑
i
zi,j = yj, for each j ∈ J,
xi ∈ {0, 1}, for each i ∈ I,
yj ∈ {0, 1}, for each j ∈ J,
zi,j ∈ {0, 1}, for each i ∈ I, j ∈ J,
where xi and yj denote if purchaser i or seller j, respectively, enters a transaction while zi,j denotes if
purchaser i transacts with seller j. Hence, social welfare is defined as the sum of all auctioneers’ payoff
and each individual agent’s utility.
2.3. Data Security and Privacy in the Smart Grid
According to [56], SG-security objectives are availability, integrity, confidentiality, authentication,
authorization, and non-repudiation. Although availability is important to provide network access
for end users, data integrity and confidentiality are more critical in the Advanced Metering Structure
(AMI) network near the final consumers.
Inviolability of consumption data is at the center of discussions in the realm of SG data-secrecy
protection. For instance, data from off-the-shelf SM are sufficient to identify TV movies viewed [57] due
to unique fluctuations in the brightness of movies influencing the energy consumption of the TV set.
In [8], a study about the impact of data granularity on edge-detection methods, which are the common
first step in nonintrusive load-monitoring algorithms, shows that devices in which consumption is
above 50 W can be detected. Moreover, data protection is specifically difficult due to the low capacity
of the SM in terms of data aggregation and data handling [58].
Masking the identity of each user is the dominant strategy in order to provide user privacy,
which is achieved by means of the assignment of false Internet Protocol (IP) data to each SM [11,59].
This technique is however sensitive to de-anonymization, which consists of the reidentification of
nodes’ identities behind their false IP. According to the probabilistic frameworks of [60], reported
consumed energy on a 10-kWh scale can reduce the percent of reidentified SMs to between 10% and
30%. One should note that it may not be applicable in regions where the law requires that energy
reporting should be done with kWh accuracy. In [57], 68% of all consumption data can be reidentified
as they have found unique combinations of feature values in the energy-consumption data of 122
households. Updating the pseudonym includes revocation of current pseudonyms and registration of
new ones, such that, in order to avoid linkage of the two pseudonyms, after revocating the old one,
the customer waits a certain period before registering the new pseudonym [59]. This time interval can
be used by a malicious observer for leveraging their reidentification capability. Furthermore, even
when SM identity is masked, the problem of mutual identification remains, since all devices must
know with whom they are communicating [61]. Hence, a list of the IP numbers should be made
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available to each node, since a basic principle is that consumers have the right to know where their
information is being shared [62].
The use of Internet Protocol (IP) and commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software is one of
the most serious vulnerabilities of SG [63]. The Internet as part of the Wide Area Network (WAN) is
considered undesirable [62]—such integration entails cyber threats since the SG is based on ethernet,
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP, and other operating systems, thus making the grid more
susceptible to attacks. Furthermore, the SG imposes much more strict security requirements than
the Internet in order to fully achieve efficient and secure information delivery for critical power
infrastructures [56]. Hence, in this paper, we assume that the Internet and off-the-shelf protocols such
as TCP/IP are not to be integrated to the SG trading infrastructure.
In [64], the authors propose a secure and privacy-friendly local electricity trading and billing
in smart grid that does not require an entity playing the role of a TTP. The following premises are
adopted by [64], namely, time synchronization of all entities, secure and authentic communication
channel and trading platform serving as a honest-but-curious entity. As shown in Section 5, the state
of the art is divided into frameworks considering and not considering the TTP. In constrast to [64]
and as shown in Section 2.5, the TTP is imposed by the trade framework based on the existence of the
utility company as a neutral player.
2.4. Cryptographic Solutions for the SG
Cryptography is a central aspect in SG data security. Several devices that embed cryptographic
applications execute their routines using symmetric or asymmetric keys. Each of these keys needs
different resources, and in practice, both types of encryption are used [65]. In fact, the state-of-the-art
presents a broad division in terms of symmetric and asymmetric keys for SG when the application is
related to the SM itself. For instance, the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem, which is based on the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), is a type of asymmetric key and is proposed as the solution for
SM in the solutions presented in [66], while other DLP-based algorithms are also proposed for a SM
application in [59,67]. However, in [7], they are described as not desirable for SG, which typically has
limited resources. The Paillier encryption is also mentioned as not computationally efficient due to its
expensive operations [5,62].
Lightweight keys can serve to protect data as long as the key is inaccessible. In [68], a comparison
of computational overheads among XOR, Shamir’s Secret Sharing, and homomorphic encryption is
presented. If C1 is the cost associated to the XOR operation, C2 is the cost associated with the Shamir’s
Secret Sharing scheme, and C3 is that with homomorphic encryption, then C1 < C2  C3. Due to its
extremely low overhead, XOR keys are used in AES, Educational Data Encryption Standard (E-DES),
and Blowfish Encryptions [69] and utilized also as encryption method as in [6].
2.5. Blockchain in the Smart Grid
Blockchains are designed to achieve peer-to-peer electronic payments directly,
without participation of a trusted third party [1] and, as such, they presuppose the lack of a
central authority or coordinator from having access to all registers and actions of a network.
This assumption collides with the role of the power-utility companies, which are held accountable
by the local regulators for the electricity assets in their area, i.e., they are responsible for billing
costumers, surveying the use of power grid assets, and further. Moreover, as largely referred to in the
state-of-the-art [21,26,33,67,70], a TTP can be adopted for the data-exchange system in the SG. The role
of a TTP is frequently assigned to the utility company due to its natural position in the respective
SG network. At least in such cases, the financial compensation between traders demands an entity
managing the energy exchanges and the respective financial transfers. Hence, due to regulatory and
executive aspects, we do not consider blockchains as a feasible solution for NAN centralized trade
frameworks.
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In [71], a new currency, the NRGcoin, is proposed, however without a detailed description of
the compensation mechanism to be mentioned here, i.e., how the financial transfer occurs and who
is in charge of surveying it. In [11], a novel blockchain-based transactive energy system is described
for energy trade between final prosumers. However, the Distribution System Operator (DSO) is set
to ensure the safe operation of the micro-grid and to regulate its total load. In order to achieve the,
the DSO can limit the energy and financial assets that the prosumers withdraw for trading. The DSO
can also set a price policy for the micro-grid, i.e., the DSO operates as a TTP. For all these limitations,
we envisage great challenges to employing blockchains for the specific case of SG trading systems.
3. Requirements for the NAN Architecture and Security Framework
The SG characteristics and requirements defined in this section derive from Section 2 and can be
referred to as the starting point for the framework to be proposed in Section 4.
As technical requirements for data security in the proposed framework, the number of interactions
between a node/unit and the central controller, which is the Trusted Third Party (TTP), as well as
between final nodes should be minimal. Each node must have a different AES 128 bit key, and the
encrypted messages can be combined with XOR encryption, as its main features are low cost and
simplicity. Time stamps must be used as an additional way of ensuring the correctness of the sender
identity, constituting an extra argument for symmetric keys. The system must be de-anonymization
proof. Neither any attacker nor harmless actors are allowed to know the identities of the bidders,
the quantity of them, where there are bids and of which type, or if any deal is achieved. The system
must resist traffic analysis attacks. The attacker is supposed to be malicious and powerful, counting on
a virtually infinite computational capability.
Although an AES 128 bit encryption key is reputably secure, an active attacker can infer recurrent
data and can identify patterns if ciphertexts are repeated. Note that the repetition of ciphertexts
in the case of SG trades is likely to occur since prices and quantities of energy can lie around
typical values, easing the task of a malicious attacker in identifying the occurrence of offers with
similar characteristics. In order to prevent this drawback, we adopt a Linear-Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR) [72], which provides a linear function of the previous state of a sequence of bits according to
the value of the most left-sited one at each iteration. The initial value of the LFSR is called a seed and
the bits that influence the next values of the LFSR are called taps. The period of a LFSR is the minimal
number of different outputs before repeating its seed and is given by p = 2n − 1, where n is the highest
position of the tap that makes the feedback polynomial achieve the maximum possible period. Tables
of the taps for maximum-length LFSR in function of each n up to 168 bits are given in [73].
In the considered NAN, the aggregator, or central operator, plays the role of a TTP. We use the
communication system shown in [13], which provides a reliable wireless intra-battery management
system and handles low values of signal-to-noise-plus-interference ratio (SNIR) by varying the length
of direct sequences of bits. This is achieved by means of code division multiplexing of several
decentralized controllers with a central controller. In doing so, the proposed patent provides a
reliable and adaptive link for communication between the TTP, which is the central controller and the
consumers in a NAN. The patent in [13] can incorporate different families of codes, including for
instance Walsh, Gold, M-sequence, Kasami, and Chaos, as well as different modulation schemes, such
as Phase Shift Keying (PSK), Quadrature PSK (QPSK), and Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS). The system
in [13] outperforms systems such as ZigBee, Bluetooth, and LoRa in terms of bit error rate (BER) and
latency for critical safety applications.
4. Proposed Framework for the NAN Electricity Trading System
The proposed framework is divided into three parts, namely the privacy-oriented data-security
system in Section 4.1, the trading system in Section 4.2, and the social welfare of the proposed system
in Section 4.3. There are common aspects between the data-security system and the trading system.
Therefore, in contrast to the literature, we present a framework taking into account both systems in
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addition to a clearing price mechanism that includes a financial reward to the power-grid company
while keeping all identities secret.
4.1. Privacy-Oriented Data-Security System
Since the creation of an AES key between each user and the TTP is a requirement to the proposed
framework, a previous step for securely assigning the generated keys is necessary. Therefore, we define
the setup zero stage which establishes necessary procedures regarding the purchase, approval,
installation, and authentication processes of an SM device to be integrated into the network. The setup
zero stage starts by considering that each SM is found accessible for purchase by means of a supplier
previously authorized by the power-utility company which is directly linked to TTP in such a way
that, during the purchase process, the supplier provides to a platform linked to the TTP, the buyer’s
data, as well as a PIN (Personal Identification Number) which allows the TPP to uniquely identify
each SM when it performs its first connection to the network.
After being installed by a TTP-authorized personnel, each SM receives an AES hardcoded key
to later perform an authentication process with the TTP regarding the device’s specific keys such as
PIN and other data previously assigned by the vendor during the purchase procedure. Once this
authentication process is concluded, the privacy-oriented system depicted in Figure 1 takes place.
At this point, it could be argued that employment of asymmetric keys [74] establishes secure
communication between the TTP and final nodes. Note that our work intends to offer a low-power
processing solution due to the SM-reduced hardware capacity. We intend to avoid key pairs generation.
Therefore, we decided to address to the TTP the task of securely assigning to each device a hardcoded
AES key. In this sense, the setup zero phase establishes a procedure to be followed by the power-utility
company or the local regulator which plays the role of a TTP in our framework.
During a day, regular intervals in which a trading session can happen are called time slots.
We adopt 15 min for each slot, as in [11]. The initial time slot is called slot zero, which corresponds
to step 1 in Figure 1, when each SM receives from the TTP a ciphertext on AES 128 bit encompassing
as contents the XOR keys K1 and K2 along with the LFSR seeds and taps and the “SM Schedule”.
The latter is a list of the time slots in which the respective node must act as a data confirmation agent if
a trading session takes place at that time slot. Since 95 slots are specified over a day, the tap of highest
order in each LFSR used must be n ≥ 7, in this case, p = 27 − 1 = 127 different keys. The keys K1 and
K2 are bit matrices with dimensions K1 and K2 ∈ Zn×u, where n is the number of houses with an SM
in the NAN and u is the length of each bid. Each row of K1 and K2 is a different LFSR with its own
seed and taps. In this paper, we adopt u = 32. Note that the rows K1 and K2 are updated by the SM
itself between two subsequent time slots.
Before a time slot ends, any authenticated node that desires to trade energy forwards to the TTP
a purchase or a sell bid, which in Figure 1 occurs in Ssep 2, i.e., the bid submission. The plaintext
of the bid, which can only be accessed by the AES key owners, must encompass the bid itself and
the IP of the bidder. Only one of the existing AES keys enables the TTP to decrypt this ciphertext
successfully, as there is a different AES key per node. The TTP decrypts the ciphertext by using all the
existing AES keys until one of them delivers a plaintext that encompasses one of the bidders IP. At this
point, the TTP validates the bid if the AES key used to attain the plaintext corresponds to the IP of
the respective AES key owner. Please note that, in the considered application, a NAN contains about
100 to 150 house units. We assume that such tests of up to 150 nodes are a reasonable task for the TTP
machine. In scenarios where the demand for scalability is necessary, the appropriate procedure is to
segment the NAN regions by installing TTP units until computational processing requirements are
met. After validating the bid, the TTP uses the same AES key to broadcast a ciphertext of a content
that comprises the IP of the bidder, which is the only node able to decrypt this message properly.
The bidder thus obtains the confirmation of its order registration. The trading session is open when,
at any instant between two time slots, at least one valid bid is decrypted by the TTP.
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Figure 1. Overall sequence of steps in the proposed framework, with the slot zero and the stages of bids submission, bids disclosure, and bids verification: Note that,
only in the slot zero and in the bids submission stage, the ciphertext is obtained via AES. The nodes designed to act as confirmation agents in a given time slot are
depicted on the right side of the figure.
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In every session, a subset v of the n households forward a bid for purchasing or selling energy
such that v ≤ n. After receiving the v offers, the TTP assembles the bit matrix P ∈ Zn×u, which is the
plaintext of all offers. Given that there are only v bids, the TTP creates (n− v) false offers and includes
all of them in P, observing that the v true bids are inserted in random rows. Thus, with the key K1,
the TTP computes
M1 = K1 ⊕ P, (6)
where ⊕ stands for the XOR operator. Hence, in step 3, the bid disclosure occurs when the TTP
broadcasts the cipher matrix M1 to all nodes after the end of the time slot in which the bids came
up. When the nodes receive M1, they learn that a trading session has been created. The SM owners
can easily compute P since they have K1. They can distinguish the true bids from the false ones as
the latter presents inconsistencies in their bit structures, which infringe the rule of bids assemblage,
as shown in detail in Section 4.2.
Several problems can affect a trading session based solely on Equation (6), since packet losses,
collision, or unfavorable SNIR conditions might prevent some nodes from receiving the cipher matrix
M1. Therefore, a confirmation step is needed, which is provided by step 4, with bids verification. Each
node that receives M1 computes a second cipher matrix,
M2 = K2 ⊕ P, (7)
which is the matrix that is used as confirmation data. The matrix K2 ∈ Zn×u differs from K1 as the
participants must prove to know the contents of P without retransmitting M1. Since the nodes are
not reputed trustworthily, they have to prove that they know the plaintext P by producing a different
ciphertext, i.e., M2. Note that the increase in memory due to this second matrix key is irrelevant as
the product nu bits reaches approximately 3 kB for each 100 house units. Note also that an external
observer cannot learn how many offers are posed by the bidders as the sizes of M1 and M2 are always
n× u. Moreover, M1 and M2 are cipher matrices that do not deliver any useful information for an
external observer that does not know K1 and K2. Recall that, in step 1, along with the SM schedule,
the TTP also informs in which second of the slot the node must confirm the data. Thus, step 4 consists
of broadcasting M2 to all nodes of the NAN during the second specified by the TTP, addressing the
requirement of using time stamps to ensure the correctness of the sender identity.
4.2. Trading System Framework
The prices transmitted by each bidder are Pr,i in
Pl < Pr,i < Pu, (8)
where r indicates the round, with r ∈ {1, 2} as the proposed system having two rounds, i denotes
the node that submits the offer, and Pr,i is the actual unitary price of the kWh offered by the ith node.
Given that v out of the existing n SM owners forward offers, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , v}. The prices P1,i and P2,i
are expressed in tenths of cents in order to reduce the probability of two offers having exactly the same
bit sequence. Two bit strings p1,i and p2,i express the values of P1,i and P2,i. Likewise, the quantity
Qi of kWh in each offer is constrained to an interval Ql < Qi < Qu, and thus, Qi is also denoted
with an auxiliary bit string qi. The bit strings p1,i, p2,i, and qi comprise 10 bits each. Instead of 1024
possible values, for simplicity, we reduce them to 999 values from 0000000001 up to 1111100111. Two
bits complete the entire sequence, namely the type t1 of the offer, with t1 = 0 for sell and t1 = 1 for
purchase offers, and the status of the order in terms of time, with t2 = 0 when the bid is valid only in
the next trading session and t2 = 1 to orders that stay valid throughout the day until a bid matches
it. A length of 32 bits of the bid is complete with t1, t2, p1,i, p2,i, and qi gathered sequentially, as in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Bits of a bid string in terms of the bid content: The length of 32 bits comprises in this order t1,
t2, p1,i, p2,i, and qi.
Purchasers must offer prices P1,i < P2,i, while sellers must set P1,i > P2,i. All prices of r = 1 interact,
producing deals as long as purchasers’ prices are equal or over sellers’ prices. Consequently, offers of
r = 2 are combined in order to achieve further deals.
When t2 = 1, price uncertainty is eliminated for the other participants. This may cause several
bids in the next time slot to have the same price values. In the case of this event, the time of arrival
establishes the priority of all incoming bids. Therefore, for two bids with exactly the same prices,
the one that arrives first at the TTP has the preference of the match.
A price mechanism is needed in order to enable the nodes to calculate the energy quantities and
prices effectively traded from the knowledge of bit matrix P, as this calculation is an internal process
of each node. As a way of providing such a mechanism for each node, our proposal consists of an
adaptation of the Trade Reduction Mechanism (TRM) presented in [49], where the difference between
specific sell and purchase offers, namely bk and sk, yield a revenue to the auctioneer, which in our case
means revenue for the utility company. Diversely, our proposal consists of producing revenues for the
utility company at each deal, according to the prices and quantities negotiated. The numbers m and
n denote the number of true purchasing and selling bids in P, of which the indexes are denoted by
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, respectively. Purchasers must bid P1,i < P2,i, while sellers must
follow P1,j > P2,j. The matches are developed first covering all possibilities with the first round prices
and then with the second round ones. In the first round, only prices P1,i and P1,j, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, are taken into account, and after all possible first matches are computed, prices
P1,i and P1,j are fully ignored and bid prices P2,i and P2,j are observed. Note that prices of both rounds
do not communicate, and as such, the two rounds are completely independent. A second reason for
this bid constitution is that, after computing bit matrix P, each node can differ the true offers from
the false ones, as bit t1 informs the relationship between both prices and computes all bids according
to their prices and quantities without needing the support of the TTP to do so. Recall that P usually
contains several false bids and each user that must identify them. For instance, if a given row of P
presents t1 = 0 and P1,i < P2,i, the node concludes that the corresponding row contains a false offer
and thus ignores it.
The true offers of matrix P are reorganized in matrices B ∈ Z4×m and in matrices S ∈ Z4×n, in
which the columns are 
P1,i
P2,i
Qi
k
 , (9)
i.e., the bids of the first and second rounds, the quantity offered,{
k = i, for matrix B, and
k = j, for matrix S.
(10)
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Thus, k is the index of a purchasing or a selling bid according to the type of bid and the
chronological criterion. In each round, the best purchasing and selling offers Pr,i and Pr,j are compared,
and a deal is achieved as long as
Pr,i ≥ Pr,j, (11)
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. In this case, the least quantity of kWh between the respective
bids Qi,Qj is stored in q′; the deal is carried out and the new best offers Pr,i and Pr,j are computed in a
sequential process until Equation (11) no longer holds. Note that the PMD of [49] ignores the quantities
of the bid in its matches. In the proposed framework, the financial reward to the auctioneer is given by
Ur =∑
i,j
q′(Pr,i − Pr,j), (12)
where Pr,i, Pr,j are those of (11).
The system is described in Algorithm 1. The outcome of Algorithm 1 is credit assignments for
each purchaser Bi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and seller Sj, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} as well as the aggregated revenue for
the utility company given by Equation (12). We define a function f (X, r) that rearranges the columns
of X so that the values of the rth row of X are sorted in accordance with Equations (1) and (2) given
each case.
Algorithm 1 Adapted Trade Reduction Mechanism (TRM) algorithm
1: procedure ADAPTED TRM (B, S)
2:
[
B1 B2 . . . Bm
]
= zeros(1,m)
3:
[
S1 S2 . . . Sn
]
= zeros(1, n)
4: for r = 1 : 2 do
5: B← f (B, r)
6: S← f (S, r)
7: i← 1
8: j← 1
9: while B(r, i) ≥ S(r, j) do
10: q′ ← min{B(3, i), S(3, j)}
11: Bi = Bi + q′B(r, i)
12: Sj = Sj + q′S(r, j)
13: Ur ← Ur + q′(B(r, i)− S(r, j))
14: B(3, i)← B(3, i)− q′
15: S(3, j)← S(3, j)− q′
16: if B(3, i) = 0 then
17: B(r, i)← Pl
18: i← i+ 1
19: end if
20: if S(r, j) = 0 then
21: S(r, j)← Pu
22: j← j+ 1
23: end if
24: end while
25: end for
26: return B1, B2, . . . , Bm, S1, S2, . . . , Sn,Ur
27: end procedure
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Note that each node assembles B and S according to Equations (9) and (10) and performs the
computations in Algorithm 1. Recall that each node is concerned only with the knowledge of all prices
and quantities and, in case the node is a bidder, whether its own bid achieves a deal.
Since sellers and purchasers trade kWh over different quantities under time constraints and
without disclosing any identities before making the offers public, our proposal is of a multidimensional,
two-sided, sealed-bid, single-unit auction system.
4.3. Social Welfare of the Proposed System
A drawback of Equation (5) is that it does not take into account the welfare corresponding to
the auctioneer itself, since it considers only the utility of purchasers and sellers. According to [49],
it is important that the money earned by the mechanism be counted as part of the social welfare.
In SG systems, it means that the reward due to the mechanism should be taken into account for social
welfare calculation.
The trades between final prosumers substitute partially the energy supplied by the big seller,
i.e., the utility company. As observed in Equation (5), the welfares fi and gj of purchasers and sellers are
related to the difference of the actual clearing prices and to the willingness to pay or costs. Recall that
captive consumers in a NAN are obliged to cope with prices Pl and Pu as shown in Equation (8). As a
consequence, while prices Pl and Pu may not indicate the subjective expectations of local prosumers,
they nevertheless inform the real prices that prosumers are obliged to practice in the case of not
achieving any deal. In this sense, Pl and Pu give the virtual willingness to pay or costs referred to in
the analysis of Equation (5) due to regulatory reasons.
Two fashions of accounting for revenues in a competitive framework are depicted in Figure 3.
In both ways, it is assumed that Pb ≥ Ps; otherwise, not a deal is achieved in a competitive system.
In Figure 3a, the average price Pa = (Pb + Ps)/2 is the clearing price in [35,36]. Taxes are applied
over the purchaser surplus (Pb − Pa) and the seller surplus (Pa − Ps). Such taxes may vary in terms of
percentage, according to regulatory dispositions. We assign to the utility company the sum of both
taxes as a way of rewarding it. Our proposal appears in Figure 3b, where we illustrate that, when there
is a deal, the purchaser practices their own purchasing price Pb, the seller practices their price Ps,
and the utility company receives the entire difference (Pb − Ps). As such, our framework emulates the
systems in [35,36] with taxes of 100%, i.e., the bidders cannot expect to pay less or to receive more than
their original bids. Note that, in all cases, the welfares fi and gj are complementary to the welfare of
the utility Ur in such a way that fi + gj +Ur = Pu − Pl .
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Figure 3. When the price of the purchaser equals or surpasses the price of the seller, Pb ≥ Ps, (a) an
average price Pa is calculated in the state-of-the-art approaches of [35,36] and taxes are applied over
the surpluses (Pb − Pa) and (Pa − Ps). (b) The proposed protocol, where the prices yield the welfares
fi and gj, which are complementary with regards to the welfare of the utility Ur = Pb − Ps, such that
fi + gj +Ur = Pu − Pl .
Note that, since the McAfee’s double-auction protocol does not consider quantities in each trade,
in real applications with different quantities of a good under trade, sequential trades can be seen as
several instantaneous McAfee’s deals, in which the average price Pa stands for the price in Equation (3)
at every interaction.
By including the utility company’s welfare in Equation (5), we have
W( f , g, d) = Maximize ∑
i
fixi +∑
j
gjyj +Ur, (13)
where Ur is the revenue for the utility given by Equation (12). In practice, we rewrite Equations (5) as
(13) by including the revenue of the utility company, as if the company was one seller or purchaser.
Note that the component ∑i,j di,jzi,j in Equation (5) stands for costs of the participants that are not
computed in the general social welfare, constituting a case of welfare loss. In our framework, however,
∑i,j di,jzi,j are the transaction costs which are fully included in Ur. In doing so, we achieve a full
BB system. For more detailed information about the convergence of the trading system framework, we
refer the reader to appendix A.
5. Results
In Section 5.1, we illustrate the performance of our framework in terms of security requirements,
and in Section 5.2, we undertake a comparison with the state-of-the-art privacy and trading systems.
5.1. Security and Computational Cost Analysis
5.1.1. Privacy Threats Along Stages of the Proposed Framework
The threat model establishes that all nodes are malicious. In the setup zero stage defined in
Section 4, attackers seek access to each SM unique parameter provided by the TTP-authorized vendor.
Their aim is to impersonate an authenticated node inside the network in a attempt to learn the identities
of the bidders. Moreover, malicious users may induce all other nodes in error by broadcasting modified
data in an attempt to gain financial advantage. Additionally, they may access all links between the
TTP and final nodes in order to disrupt the grid by harming broadcasted content.
In the D-Y adversary model, an attacker is assumed unable to break cryptographic primitives [9].
Thus, the slot zero and the bids submission stage are considered data leakage proof as the required
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time for breaking AES keys is in the order of 1037 seconds [69]. Note that a node that forwards
an offer in the bids submission stage includes its own IP in the plaintext, which is encrypted, and
that the TTP confirms the arrival of any valid offer to its author. Furthermore, the exact instant of this
message forward is uncertain over the entire duration of the time slot. A successful attack in this case
demands continuous and explicitly intrusive actions. This collides with the notion in [75], according to
which malicious data attacker are supposed to compromise as few data as possible in order to inject
undetectable attacks with the lowest cost and effort. Hence, the probability of successful attacks in the
slot zero and bids submission stage is assumed significantly unlikely.
In terms of data protection, it is useful to see that, for an external observer, the messages from
the SMs and the TTP can be of any content as all nodes are supposed to exchange data with the TTP
informing for instance the node availability, voltage measurements, etc. In Figure 4, the adversary is
represented by the red vehicle. It receives also dummy packets that can be exchanged between TTP
and the SMs in order to thwart traffic analysis attacks. As a consequence, it is not possible for the
adversary (spy) to infer the purpose of such messages. For internal attackers, i.e., those who possess an
SM and are authenticated, it is equally not possible to devise the contents of the messages exchanged
by the TTP and the other nodes, given that all the AES keys are different. As a consequence, in the
slot zero and in the bids submission stages, the external observer can infer no useful information.
In the bids disclosure stage, the bit matrix M1 is broadcast to all SMs of the NAN. The nodes are now
more vulnerable to attacks on the data content since the adversary can see the TTP broadcasting data
of nu bits, which is always the dimension of M1. The spy might decide to try to alter the ciphertext
bits deliberately; however, in order to compromise the entirety of broadcast data, the attacker must
access all links between the TTP and final nodes, a very problematic task if the network is sufficiently
spread spatially. In the bids verification stage, the matrix M2 has, in comparison to the bit matrix
M1, two additional protections: specified nodes are programmed to broadcast it and in specific time
windows—in Figure 4, house units 6 and 4 are the scheduled nodes and have the time windows t1 and
t2, respectively—as a case of time-stamp application. Only when the attacker knows in advance which
nodes are scheduled to broadcast M2 in the respective time slot can it harm the broadcasts content.
However, it is taken as impossible due to the lack of access to the AES keys between the TTP and the
other nodes, which derives from the D-Y adversary model. Note that, due to the sequence of stages,
the spy can neither infer how many orders are posed nor of which type they are.
Suppose that the attacker is an internal node and that it is scheduled to broadcast M2. It can
broadcast a different matrix, say M′2, to try to induce errors in all other nodes. However, such an attack
cannot avoid the nodes receiving the correct M2 from other scheduled nodes. Moreover, the TTP
undertakes strict surveillance over the broadcasted M2 contents. A node that broadcasts a false version
M′2 is included in the Revocation List, even when it transmits the correct share Ej. The protocol admits
that a scheduled node does not broadcast M2, since it might not have received M1 due to package
losses. In comparison to an external observer, which is not authenticated, an internal node can learn
the number and the types of bids; however they are not able to link them with the respective authors.
5.1.2. Security and Privacy Features
We classify our framework under the requirements of anonymity, untraceability, no impersonation,
unforgeability, non-repudiation, verifiability, non-linkability, linkability within a single bidding round,
privacy, forward security, authenticity, and integrity as presented in [76].
Anonymity is achieved when no unauthorized entity is able to identify the bidder during
the bidding. Our system accomplishes this goal via AES keys between each bidder and the TTP.
Dummy packets and the constant size of matrices M1 and M2 avoid identification by means of traffic
analysis. Untraceability is attained when the bid winner cannot be identified at the end of the bidding
by untrusted entities. However, the winning bidder’s legitimacy should be verifiable. Furthermore,
no individual should be traceable during a bidding round. Our framework meets this requirement as
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the matrices M1 and M2 deliver and confirm all informations about the bids; all nodes can know the
winner bid. Note that the winner identity is never accessible for any node.
When no one participates in the bidding with the identity of another bidder, no impersonation
is achieved. Since all nodes are only admitted when their ciphertexts include their IP into the AES
encrypted message, the TTP cannot accept false participants. Unforgeability is fulfilled when no
one is able to falsify a valid bidding price. In the proposed framework, it derives from the no
impersonation requirement.
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Figure 4. Sequence of stages in the proposed framework from the standpoint of a spy: Due to the sequence of stages, the spy can neither infer how many orders are
posed nor of which type they are.
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Non-repudiation is observed when the bidders cannot deny their bid after the winning bidder
has been announced. After sending a bid and after the TTP accepts, the node cannot deny its offer,
which makes part of matrices M1 and M2, as the TTP is assumed inviolable. Verifiability is achieved
when anyone can verify the validity of the bids. This relies on the fact that matrix M2 reproduces the
content of matrix P from what is informed by M1.
Non-linkability among various bidding rounds consists of no participant being able to access
results that enable a bidder to be identified in various bidding rounds. Due to the invariable sizes of M1
and M2, it is impossible even for authenticated nodes to know when a node submits bids. Linkability
within a single bidding round is achieved when anyone can determine the number of times a bidder
has bid, which in the case of the proposed framework is straightforward as it imposes that each node
bids a maximum of only once per time slot. In terms of privacy, untrusted entities must not be able to
link bids to individual consumers. Moreover, they must not be able to infer private information about
individual consumers. It is applicable even for internal nodes.
Even if the current bidding key is compromised, no information about the previous keys should
be leaked, which is the concept of Forward Security. The LFSR ensures that the XOR keys are not
repeated from one time slot to another, making it infeasible to access the previously submitted bids.
Authenticity and integrity of all bid notifications occurs when all bids are be verifiable. The TTP
verifies it with regards to each ciphertext received.
The single registration requirement consists of a bidder being required to register in the system
only once, and then, they can participate in all future bid sessions. In our framework, this is provided
with the secrecy of the XOR keys with their seeds and taps. Using matrices K1 and K2, every node can
forward intelligible bids, when it is automatically admitted as a participant. Easy revocation is defined
as the ease for the registration manager to revoke a bidder. In case of errors, the TTP in our system
easily revocates a scheduled node that broadcasts false contents or a bidder that tries to submit an
impossible bid—for instance, a purchasing bid in a household that has not generate assets. Incentive
allocation consists of the bid winner being able to claim the incentive without revealing their identity,
and no other entity should be able to impersonate the winner. The winner can claim the incentive by
messages between it and the TTP. Furthermore, in case of the same bid prices, the TTP chooses the
winning bid with a temporal criterion, i.e., that is forwarded first and can inform this fact to a bidder
that claims a deal.
5.2. Comparison with the State-of-the-Art Privacy and Trading Systems
Comparing the proposed framework with the state-of-the-art ones, Table 2 shows the results in
terms of privacy in the SG, with 1 for existing and 0 for nonexisting features. As a privacy enhancement
methods [1,67,76] use DLP-based encryption systems, which have a comparatively high computational
complexity. In [78], nodes embedded with distributed controllers coordinate with neighboring peers
in order to find the optimal operating data, such as instantaneous consumption power. In doing so,
they transmit plaintext information, and therefore, none of the common cryptographic techniques is
applied. In [11], employing a large number of anonymous addresses is part of the solution for privacy
attainment, contrary to our framework and to the discussion of Section 2.3. The address of each SM
is disclosed in [76] and in the proposed framework only to a central controller, while in [78], it is
disclosed only to one-hop nodes. Interested parties can possibly be identified as such by a malicious
observer in all compared systems by means of traffic analysis or address de-anonymization, i.e., an
observer can identify the role of a participant by such attacks, while in our system, it is completely
avoided. The proposed framework is de-anonymization proof since, even when the IP of a node is
identified, an observer cannot conclude if the node is a bidder. For instance, note that the SM schedule
establishes that nodes that do not take part in the bids forward the matrix M2.
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Table 2. Comparison between the proposed framework and the state-of-the-art approaches in terms
of privacy.
Reference [1] [67] [76] [78] [11] Proposed
Privacy enhancement method
DLP-based public
key + secure
hash algorithm
DLP-based public
key (Boneh-
Goh-Nissim)
DLP-based public
key (ElGamal) None
Anonymous
Addresses +
cryptographic
signature
AES keys +
XOR matrix of
fixed length
Cost of cryptography High High High None Medium Low
Disclosure of SM address 1 1 1 1 0 1
Dismissal of secure
communication channel 1 1 0 0 1 1
ID de-anonymization proof 0 0 1 0 0 1
Absence of need for
connection between
each pair of nodes
0 1 1 1 0 1
Impossibility of interested
parties identification 0 0 0 0 0 1
In Table 3, the proposed framework and the state-of-the-art schemes are compared in terms of
pricing systems. Our framework allows for free-price formation and a variety of different auction
systems, as for instance the suggested one [49]. The proposed framework also dismisses previous
information about energy consumption profile. Such data are a requisite for the systems in [41],
which characterizes the operation for the benchmark scenario of a DR market where the operator
has full information of all DR-related parameters, such as the utility function of the consumers,
which is representative of their consumption profile and decision-making process. The proposed
framework also allows the inclusion of storage elements, which are excluded from the systems such
as in [20], which develops an energy-trading system of a community energy storage (CES) device for
demand-side load management within a neighborhood area network. The energy users that have their
own photovoltaic power generation are allowed to trade energy from their personal surplus with the
grid and the CES device in a competitive game framework. Pricing freedom is fully guaranteed in
[3,34]. In [53], a power market scheduling center (PMSC) is proposed, which manages all the energy
providers and makes them provide a unified price to the subscribers, and energy providers generate
the optimal quantity of electricity to get maximum utilities. In [41], aggregators provide DR services to
the operator and guarantee a reduced electricity bill to the end users, negotiating with both sides in
order to maximize its own profit. In [24], a regulatory authority calculates the instantaneous prices
that minimize the total social cost based on the knowledge of the utility functions of the associated
consumers, establishing a unique value to them. In these examples, the final consumers are limited to
playing the role of price takers.
Table 3. Comparison with the state-of-the-art approaches in terms of pricing systems.
Reference [53] [33] [41] [79] [18] [22] [20] [23] [24] [3] [16] [34] Proposed
Dismissal of consumption
profile assumptions 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Possibility of
storage elements inclusion 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Pricing freedom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Inclusion of a TTP 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
Competitive market 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
6. Conclusions
As an emerging cyber-physical system, the SG is attractive for enabling distributed energy control,
allowing for high levels of automation and security of the power system. Power is already produced
inside the boundaries of final user real states and is exported to the company or to other consumers.
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As a consequence, the old grid structures must be reformulated. With regards specifically to the prices
in the new electrical systems, a key aspect is that the utility company usually sells the energy for a
unitary price Pu to their consumers and buys back the energy of prosumers for a different unitary
price, Pl , yielding the range for dealing prices between final users.
In the proposed framework, we provide an effective approach for privacy protection for prosumers
in a NAN that takes into account the problem of self-interested players that intend to trade energy in the
context of a NAN. We additionally present a clear pricing mechanism that allows for each smart meter
to calculate the final prices and respective amounts of energy that are traded, including a financial
reward to the power-grid company, while keeping all identities secret. The communication links are
provided by a patent-pending proprietary communication system. Our results show higher consistency
when compared to the state-of-the-art models, especially in what concerns privacy protection against
IP de-anonymization and traffic analysis attack. In order to achieve these objectives, we use AES 128
bit associated with LFSR-based XOR matrices, which have constant sizes, independent of the number
of bidders. In doing so, our cryptographic framework has a considerable low computational cost.
Concerning future works, a first step is to monitor the trends of the SM industry in order to
determine whether off-the-shelf SM can utilize asymmetric keys and can resist active attacks of all
types. Tests with real SMs in a NAN are also required in order to measure typical values of package
losses and Signal no Noise Ratio (SNR) as a function of the NAN infrastructure and topology. Finally,
the proposed energy-trade model must undergo regulatory discussions before it can be implemented
in realistic scenarios.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this paper:
NAN Neighborhood Area Network
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
XOR Exclusive-OR
SGs Smart Grids
SM Smart Meters
HAN Home Area Network
DER Distributed Energy Resources
NEM Net Energy Metering
KWh kilowatt-hours
AMS Advanced Metering Structure
IP Internet Protocol
WAN Wide Area Network
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DLP Discrete Logarithm Problem
DSO Distribution System Operator
TTP Trusted Third Party
LFSR Linear-Feedback Shift Register
SNIR Signal-to-Noise-plus-Interference Ratio
PSK Phase Shift Keying
QPSK Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
CSS Chirp Spread Spectrum
BER Bit Error Rate
TRM Trade Reduction Mechanism
PMSC Power Market Scheduling Center
Appendix A
This appendix presents an example conceived to clarify the convergence of the trading system
framework discussed in Section 4.1. Example 1. Let a NAN be 150 house units numbered from 1 to
150, from which 110 are equipped with an SM. Among all 110 authorized nodes, 4 purchasers and 4
sellers forward their bids in a given time slot of the day, such that n = 110 and v = 8. After recognizing
the origin and validity of each bid in accordance to their AES key as explained in Section 4.1, the TTP
knows all offers and sets up the content in Table A1. In this example, H informs the number of each
participating house unit, the pair t1t2 are directly given by bits, while the prices P1,i and P2,i and the
amount of energy Qi are informed by their values after conversion. Furthermore, let Pl = 1500 and
Pu = 2000, so that the range of Pr,i as given by Equation (8) is between $1.50/kWh and $2.00/kWh.
Table A1. Bids as received
by the TTP in a given time slot—Example 1.
Purchasers Sellers
H t1t2 P1,i P2,i Qi H t1t2 P1,i P2,i Qi
80 11 1555 1556 80 31 00 1800 1790 140
3 10 1820 1830 90 142 00 1900 1870 200
115 10 1501 1877 100 99 00 1910 1920 65
77 10 1845 1846 30 10 00 1960 1580 70
From all the bids of Table A1, note that the bid of house unit 99 is inconsistent, as sellers must
set P1,i > P2,i. As a consequence, the TTP does not take this offer into account when assembling the
matrix P that is sent to all nodes by means of M1. Furthermore, the node 99 is included by the TTP
in the Revocation List, staying unable to take part in future bids until the problem with the node is
clarified and fixed. Note also that, while assembling the matrix P, the TTP removes the information
about columns H shown in Table A1. Hence, all nodes receive only the data related to the bids and not
to their authors, which are learned only by the TTP.
By applying Algorithm 1, two rounds are performed: first with r = 1 and only then with r = 2.
In summary, at each step, the lowest seller and higher purchaser prices are combined until the lowest
energy quantity between them is achieved. Starting with r = 1, only the prices P1,i are considered.
Observing Table A1, the best offers from each side purchase 30 kWh at $1.845/kWh and sell 140 kWh
at $1.80/kWh from house units 77 and 31, respectively. The lowest energy amount, i.e., 30 kWh, is
the quantity that is effectively traded between them. The prices of each side are practiced, so that the
utility company receives the difference. Hence, at this first step, house unit 77 spends $1.845/kWh
for buying 30 kWh from house unit 31, which receives $1.80/kWh for the 30 kWh, while the utility
company is rewarded with 30 × $0.045 = $1.35.
As house unit 31 has still 110 kWh available after supplying house 77, the next best purchaser is
considered—if its offer is compatible with the seller value, a new deal is achieved. Still with r = 1,
house unit 3 intends to purchase 90 kWh at $1.82/kWh. Since it offers a higher price than the seller,
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house 3 obtains 90 kWh from house 31, paying 90 × $1.82 = $163.8, while house 31 receives 90 × $1.80
= $162. The difference of $1.8 is appropriated by the utility company.
At this point, house unit 31 still has 20 kWh to trade. However, the best remaining purchase offer
is lower than the selling price. Now, all deals with r = 1 are finished and the second round, r = 2, is
started.
The best prices P2,i from the purchase side is $1.877/kWh for 100 kWh from house unit 115.
It covers the sellers’ offer of 70 kWh from house 10, the remaining 20 kWh from house 31, and part of
the offer from house 142. After these deals, house 142 has still 190 kWh to sell at $1.87/kWh. However,
the best remaining P2,i from the purchase side is now $1.846/kWh. At this point, all the deals are
finished for this slot.
Note that, in this example, the offer from house unit 80 is not considered in any deal. However,
it is the only bid with t2 = 1, making it valid throughout the day until a match is obtained. Since all the
bidders learn that a purchase offer of $1.555/kWh is valid for the next slot, the bids at this price that
arrives at the TTP are considered to have the preference in accordance to the instant of the bid arrival.
All the routines of this example are performed internally by each node from the knowledge of
matrix P. Therefore, by the end of the Algorithm 1 application, all nodes learn which quantities were
traded at each prices; however, not knowing the identities of the bidders.
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